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COMPILING THE TERRITORIAL CODES
OF WASHINGTON

The story of the codes of laws which have been
Territory of Washington is little known. Little ha
of their influence on the legal history of the territor
and less has been recorded concerning those whose
has produced these codifications. Some phases of t
influences which form the background of the cod

ington Territory, and the important parts play

makers, have become either lost or shrouded in obl
not far distant future the stories of other phases o

history may pass from the memory of man and becom
forgotten.
I.

The Oregon Territory, at the time when its area was greatest, included within its boundaries, in addition to the present
state of Oregon, the vast expanse of lands now included in the
states of Washington, Idaho, and part of Montana. Since this
entire area constituted the Oregon Territory, the laws of Oregon prior to the partition of 1854 were the laws of those states
and portions of states since carved from it. It follows then that
the laws in force in Oregon at the time Washington was made
a separate territory likewise had been the laws enforced in the
area north of the Columbia River for the thirteen years preceding.
It does not follow, because of the existence of a certain
body of laws within a given area at the time it is made into a
territory, that these laws shall become ipso facto the laws of the
new territory. The newly created territorial legislature may, if
it so desires, adopt any or all of them as the law of the new territory, or may reject them in toto and then proceed to enact a
completely different body of statute law. However this may be,
it is reasonable to presume that familiarity with the laws previously existent will influence in a positive manner the legislation subsequently enacted by the legislature of the newly creat-

(3)
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ed territory. Such influence was manifested in the selec
laws for the new territory of Washington in two definit
In the first place, the Congress of the United States incl
the Organic Act creating the new territory a provision
tinuing in force in Washington Territory all laws of O
Territory, whether of federal or territorial origin, whic
applicable to the new territory.

This influence of the Oregon law was, in the second
expressed by the first territorial legislature in its adopt
certain of the laws of Oregon which had been in force

counties north of the Columbia. The laws of Oregon

were made a part of the statute law of Washington Ter
in this manner were mostly from the political code of O
and included the election law, and other laws with whi
people were quite familiar.
II.

The first session of the territorial legislature of Washington convened in Olympia, on February 28, 1854. It is interesting to note that the first bill introduced into the House of Representatives was "An act to provide for the appointment of a
board of commissioners to prepare a code of laws for the territory of Washington." The importance given to the need for
drafting a code of laws for the territory was partly a reflection
of that public sentiment which sought the enactment of a com-

plete system of laws especially applicable to the new territory.
Such a sentiment was crystallized in an editorial comment2 by
one of the leading newspapers in which the editor expressed a

feeling that the laws "should be few and well ordered," and

"that none should be enacted without suitable deliberation, an3
with an object to their being favorably received, enforced, and

applicable to this portion of the Pacific Coast." The editorial
advised the repeal of the "Oregon Steamboat Code," and "Blue
Books," which had been the subject of so much confusion and
objection south of the Columbia River,8 and urged the appointment of a code commission to complete a code of laws. What
1 Act. of March 2, 1853, Ch. 90, Sec. 12, 10 Stat. 177.
2 Olympia (Wash.) The Pioneer and Democrat, February 11, 1854.
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may appear to the reader as somewhat amus
ment that the new territory was now "of
"people did not wish to be tributary to Orego
Governor Stevens likewise sensed the imp
matter of such legislation, and in his message
lature urged that certain of the laws of Oreg

"In the matter of legislation/' he said, "I would sug
seems to be some ambiguity as to the state of statut
force in this Territory, some course be adopted whi

from the present uncertainty, shall not render the comm

titute of law. Such a result might be effected, by en
laws of Oregon as still remain applicable to this Terri
at the same time suitable persons occupied in prepar
present exigencies may need."4

The act which provided for the code com
sed on March 3,5 and by its terms appointed
of Edward Lander, then United States Distri
tor Monroe and William Strong, both of w
guished judges of the territory. It was to be
pare such laws as in their judgment would be
necessary for preserving the public peace and
inhabitants of the territory.

The personnel of the commission represen

most brilliant legal minds within the new terri

ory of Washington, Snowden has said that :
"Wiser selections could not have been made. The commissioners
were already trained in the law, familiar with its forms, and experienced
in its administration. They knew better than anybody else then in the territory could know, what would be required to set up a government, maintain public order, provide for public improvements, establish courts and
regulate the practice in them ; to define crimes and various offenses, and
prescribe their punishment, as well as to provide for levying, collecting
and disbursing revenue. They knew also how to avail themselves of the
experience; and they knew how to put all these things in form, so that
they would conform to the organic law, and stand the test of administration."6

3 Arthur S. Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," in The Pacific Northwest Quarterly (Seattle, 1936), xxvii, 10.
4 Journal of the House ot Representatives, iö^-, ¿u.

'Laws of Washington, 1854,451. _ _ _ _

«C. A. Snowden, History of Washington ^JNew xonc, iwyj, hi, ¿o/.
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The act creating the code commission required the co
missioners to submit to the standing committees of the l
ture from day to day such laws as they had drafted. Th
done to avoid any difficulty over the interpretation of s
six of the Organic Act which required that each act shou
brace but one object to be expressed in its title. Doubtles

memory of the quarrel over the validity of the "Stea
Code" of Oregon was still fresh in their minds.7 The pr
upon the code commission of Judge Strong was another
against any attempt that might be made to adopt a code

single act. Judge Strong, while sitting as a judge of t
preme Court of Oregon Territory, had already declared

such a proceedure was in conflict with a provision in the
ic Act of Oregon Territory identical to that of section six of

Organic Act of Washington. The powers of the comm

were very broad and were limited only by the need of pr
ing the public peace and well-being of the inhabitants.
Included in the sixty-five acts of a general nature ena
at this session were the various practice and procedural
such as the Civil Practice Act, the Criminal Code, the Cr
nal Practice Act, the Probate Code, and the Justice Prac

Code. It was in connection with the drafting of these

that the work of the code commission was best performe
Civil Practice Act was in the main based upon the law of
York with occasional interpretations from Indiana and O
These were the states in which the commissioners had resided

before coming to the Oregon country, and naturally represented

the laws with which they were most familiar. The other acts
show unmistakingly the influence of the Oregon laws which

had been borrowed from the laws of Iowa.

After a session lasting sixty- four days, the legislature adjourned on May 1, 1854. Shortly before adjournment the code
commission submitted its final report, and in a letter to the
legislature expressed its feeling of the honor of having been
able to assist in framing a body of laws. It commented upon
the difficulties under which its work had been done, the limited
time allowed in which to do it, and the "want of the statutes of
7 Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 10.
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most of the older states." The commissioner
probable presence of many errors which wou

tion at some future time, but expressed the hop
not such as would create serious embarrassments in the admin-

istration of justice.
Such historians as have discussed the work of this first

legislature have given it high praise. They have referred to the
fact that the laws passed at this session remained the law of the
territory for many years, and that subsequent amendments in

no way improved the "system [of law] which had emanated
from those two vigorous legal minds and learned jurists, Edward Lander and William Strong."8
III.

In commenting upon the unwise legislative attempts to im
prove the quality of the provisions of the Code of 1854, Judg
Elwood Evans spoke with a first-hand acquaintance, although
his comments were written many years after these attempts

codification had been made. He had been closely associate

with these subsequent revisions of statutory law. In fact, he
had served as code commissioner during several of the legis-

lative sessions which had provided the Codes of 1859, 186
1871, and 1873 respectively. His reference to the "creditab

system" of laws adopted in 1854 and the innovations made b
these later revisions must not be construed as reflecting a qua
ity of impotence in the later codes, nor a criticism of his ow
contributions to the statute law of Washington. The though
which he endeavored to express was that of the enduring qua
ity of the Code of 1854. He regarded it in much the same ma
ner as it was referred to by Judge Lander, who characterized
as constituting a "body of laws which are to become the found
tion of jurisprudence in our young Territory."

The revisions of the Code of 1854 which were made in

1859, 1863, 1869, 1871, and 1873 respectively, had as their o
ject the perfection of the acts of civil procedure and practic

8 Elwood Evans, "Political and local history of Washington as a separate Territorial Government . . . ," in History of The Pacific Northwest: Oregon and Was
ington (Portland, Ore., 1889), i, 466. Evans for some reason omits all reference

Victor Monroe.
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criminal procedure, probate procedure, and justice court
dure. They were complete codes of these statutory prac

much the same form as similar laws are now codified in several

states - California being a typical example. With the exception
of the Code of 1869, they are not to be regarded as general
codes or compilations; nor should they be compared with the
expertly developed codes of the present day, except in so far as
they were then, as now, the measure of the extent of social and
economic relations.

The first agitation for a revision of the Code of 1854 began in 1857. The Code of 1854 had been in operation less than
three years when the territorial legislature considered a joint
resolution to appoint a committee of five members to "inquire
into the expediency of appointing a commission to revise the
laws of this Territory." This committee on December 24, 1857,
recommended that a committee from both branches of the legis-

lature be appointed as a commission to compile and codify the
laws of the territory prior to the opening of the next session of
the legislative assembly.9

This resolution had originated in the House of Representatives, and although it was accepted by the Council on December 24, it was displaced by Council Joint Resolution No. 210
which was agreed to by the House of Representatives and became effective on January 6, 1858. The latter resolution was
designed to relieve the legislature from the arduous task of
code revision and to appoint a commission of experts to perform this duty. By its terms it provided for the appointment of

William Strong, Selucius Garfielde, and Butler P. Anderson to
act as code commissioners to revise and compile the laws of
Washington Territory11 and to report their labor to the next

legislative session (1858).
Probably the report of this code commission was for the
most part the work of Mr. Anderson, who was then living in
Olympia. There is nothing to show that the other commissioners contributed anything toward it. In fact, the joint resolution

passed by the next succeeding legislature on December 16,
» Journal of the Council. 1857-58. 49.
10 ibid., 62.

n Laws of Washington, 1857-58, 69.
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1859, hinted as much. It referred to the r
B. P. Anderson, Esq., one member of the c
at the last session ... to revise and compile
purpose of this resolution of December 16
into consideration and recommend some c
relative to the report."13

When the legislature convened in De
Anderson addressed a letter to the Spea
of Representatives advising him that, a

commissioners, he had devoted his spare t
compiling the statutes, and that he had cov
of the laws. He stated that a complete "re
attempted ; and that more time would be r
ture desired the compilation to be completed

The code, which Mr. Anderson presen

subject of a joint resolution15 passed Decem
ing a special joint committee of members f
take into consideration and recommend som
sued . . . relative to the report . . . ." The s
tee, speaking through its chairman, report
December 16 16 "that about two-thirds of said laws have been

compiled, and that twenty-five days will be required to finish
the compilation. Therefore, the committee have instructed me
to recommend that B. P. Anderson, Esq., be requested to complete the compilation, and report the same to this Legislative
Assembly on or before the 20th day of January, 1859."

On the 19th day of January, Mr. Anderson addressed another letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, advising him that the work of compiling the laws had been completed, and had been turned over to the legislative committee.
12 Laws of Washington, 1858-59, 67-68.
18Judge Strong had previously served on the Code Commission of 1854 and was
at this time an associate justice of the Supreme Court; Butler P. Anderson and
Selucius Garfielde were both prominent members of the territorial bar. Mr. Anderson had been prosecuting attorney of the territory. Mr. Garfielde, a resident of Seattle, later served as Surveyor-General, Delegate to Congress, and Collector of Customs. He was famed as an orator of unusual ability.
14 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1858-59, 7-8.
™Laws of Washington, 1858-59, 67 ; Journal of the Council 1858-59, 25.
16 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1858-59, 34; Journal of the Council,
1858-59, 30.
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He called particular attention to the fact that only the g
laws had been codified, and that private and local laws had
purposely omitted, as well as those which were either ob
or had been expressly repealed.
After considering the proposed Code of 1859 (1860) t
select committee, again speaking through its chairman,
Biles, on January 20th reported to the legislature17 tha
had examined the report of Butler P. Anderson, and that

what it purported to be, an all-sufficient revision and
pilation of the laws of Washington Territory. The comm
concluded its report by recommending that the propose
be "laid upon the table of the House," which was done. T
it remained until it was revived by the legislative sessio

1859-60.

Political squabbles and personal animosities kept the report of Mr. Anderson from favorable consideration for some
time after the legislative session of 1859-60 had begun. The
controversy concerned in no way the qualifications of Mr. Anderson as a codifier nor the quality of his labors. It was rather
a question of whether the territory or the United States should
provide the compensation for the work of preparing the compilation and the funds for printing it. The Congress had provided most of the costs of previous printings of the laws and
the codes, although the expenses incident to the preparation
of the same had been recognized as a proper territorial expense.
The policy of opposition to the adoption of this Code of

1859 (1860) was largely reflected in the activities of H. J.
G. Maxon, of Clark county. On the 24th of January, 1859, Mr.

Maxon introduced a resolution into the Council which stated in
its preamble that18

"Whereas, it is the opinion of this council that the joint resolution
passed by the last legislature, authorizing a board of commissioners to re-

vise and compile the laws of Washington Territory, was not complied
with, and that the compilation made by B. P. Anderson, Esq., was not
authorized; and
"Whereas, we are of opinion that this legislature and the people of
the territory are responsible for, and that the territorial treasury is liable
to be drawn upon for said compilation ; therefore
« Ibid.. 166.

18 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 176.
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"Resolved, that the President of the Council be, an
instructed to address a note to B. P. Anderson, Esq.,
municate in writing to this body that he will, in no
territory, whether as a part of the commission, or as
upon his own responsibility, (until authorized by the
any compensation whatever from the treasury of said
that the whole subject under consideration may be sp
nals, and thus be made a matter of record."

Apparently two reasons were in Mr. Maxon
troducing the above resolution. Both were ext
in their character and probably reflected a p
toward a revision of the Code. The joint reso
been adopted on January 6, 1858, providing f
mission, had stated that ". . . it shall be their
duty to report the result of their labors to th
assembly; Provided, however, that in no even
torial treasury be drawn upon for said revisi
further, that in case any of the above named
fuse to act as such, the Governor of this Terr
some suitable person to fill the vacancy occas

fusal."19 Two members of the said commission had refused to

act; and it was evident, notwithstanding the language of the
resolution of January 6, 1858, that the territory would be called
upon to reimburse Mr. Anderson for his labors. So, if the reso-

lution of January 6, 1858 was to be given a strict interpretation, it had not, as Mr. Maxon contended, been complied with.
Mr. Maxon apparently was willing to waive the first objection
if Mr. Anderson was willing to look to the United States rather
than to the territory for his remuneration. In the meantime,

the House had received House Bill No. 57 providing for the
publication of the compiled laws of Washington Territory.
The Council was notified of the introduction of this bill on

January 27, 1859.
Anticipating a negative reply from Mr. Anderson to this
resolution of January 24, 1859, Mr. Maxon introduced into the
Council on January 27th a resolution addressed to the public
printer, Mr. Furste,20
19 Laws of Washington, 1857-58, 69.
20 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 192.
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"asking him to communicate in writing, distinctly stating whethe
not he is willing to print the revision and compilation of laws of W
ington Territory, made by B. P. Anderson, Esq. ; and should such w
ingness be expressed, that he be asked to state, unequivocally, that
event will he look to Washington Territory, (or the treasury thereof
any portion of the cost of the printing of said revision and compilat

Written replies were received by the Council on Janu
28, 1859, from both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Furste. Their

tents are not stated in the Council proceedings but the infere

is clear that in both cases the answer was in the negative.
motion of Mr. Maxon, the reply was, in each case, referr

the Ways and Means Committee - an appropriate place
which to bury them.21

The day following the receipt of the replies from Mr. A

derson and Mr. Furste, (January 29, 1859) the chairma

the Judiciary committee, Mr. Maxon, introduced Council
No. 31, entitled, "An act to provide for the appointment
board of commissioners to prepare, revise and compile a cod
laws for Washington Territory."
While these proceedings were going on in the Council,
House had passed22 a bill to pay for the cost of Mr. Ander
compilation, which in the Council reached two readings, a
was then referred to the committee on Ways and Means.
committee reported the bill back to the Council without re
mendation, and this on being ordered to a third reading, w
the motion of Mr. Maxon laid on the table and made a special

der for the fourth of February ensuing. This was a death
to the bill for the payment of Mr. Anderson's services, si
February 4 was to be the day after the constitutional lim

21 At this point it would seem appropriate to discuss the significance of the
stantly recurring reference to the implied obligation of the United States to pa
the printing of the laws of the territory. This was an obligation which the f
government had assumed from the beginning of the territory. This responsibil
the federal government explains the annual attempts made tò revise the laws

United States paid the bill. While the records show a persistent demand from

Governor, the public, and the press for a complete codification of the laws, the
lative assembly had just as persistently refused to grant their request, and ha
deavored to placate the public by reenactments of the practice codes as part o
session laws, knowing that these costs would be assumed by the federal governm
whereas the cost of a complete codification might not be assumed. Hence the co

troversy over the Anderson code was in reality a fight to impose the cost o

Code of 1859 (1860) upon the federal government, thereby saving the expenditu

territorial funds.

22 Evans, "Political and local history of Washington . . . ," in History of The

Pacific Northwest, i, 523.
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the legislature had expired and the day follo
ment thereof.

When House Bill No. 57, entitled "An ac

the publication of the compiled laws of Wash
came before the Council, it was referred to
Ways and Means which reported it out for
the Council. It came before the Council for the first test on

Tuesday, February 1, 1859. There Mr. Maxon, attacked it by a
motion to lay it on the table and to make it a "special order of
the day for the 4th of July next."23 Apparently he wished it to

die amid the glamour of a patriotic celebration. Thus ended the
attempt to provide for the publication of the compiled laws of

Washington Territory as a separate publication independent

of the session laws of 1859-60.

The Council Bill No. 31, entitled "An act to provide for
the appointment of a board of commissioners to prepare, revise
and compile a code of laws for Washington Territory," which
had been introduced by Mr. Maxon had successfully passed the
Council, but was amended in some manner (the proceedings do
not indicate in what way) when it came before the House. The
Council refused to concur in the House amendments and the bill

failed of passage on February 2, 1859,24 the day before the last
of the legislative session.

The Code of 1859 (1860) was the result of the work of

the code commission of 1858. While it is referred to as the

Code of 1859 /it was not enacted into law until early in January

of I860.25 A valid doubt existed as to the need for this code;
and an opinion generally expressed was that it added nothing
of importance to the Code of 1854. The popular esteem accorded the Code of 1854 may explain the lack of any evidence that
Judge Strong had contributed his services to its preparation,
IV

It was the duty of the governor of the territory to refer in

his legislative messages to such changes in the law as he
deemed desirable. The fulfillment of this duty could be carried
23 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 221.

2* Ibid., 22Ö.
25 Laws of Washington, 1859-60.
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out by advising the legislature that "a revision of our
badly needed." Sometimes he specifically referred to t
age of copies of the session laws and made that condit
basis of his recommendation. Often-times the messag
use the word "compilation" jointly with the word "re
It can hardly be supposed that such a recommendation
ernor Turney, on December 19, 1861, contemplated oth
the amendment of such statutes as needed modification and

their re-passage as complete acts. The legislative practice during this territorial period called for amending a statute by reenacting it in toto with the changes desired ; whereas the practice, today, is to pass an act amending only the sections concerned, leaving the remainder of the statute untouched. Certainly the technical meaning of the words "revision" and "compilation," as they are used today, was not observed in the preparation of the territorial codes during the two decades following the organization of Washington Territory.
The legislative session of 1861-62 made no efifort to enact legislation for revising the territorial laws. Accordingly,
when the session of 1862-63 convened, Governor Pickering devoted a considerable portion of his legislative message to a plea
for a "codification and republication of our Territorial Law,"
in the belief that "convenience, necessity, and justice to the peo-

ple require legislative action at this time, . . ,"26 This advice of
the executive was followed and the Code of 1863 was the result.

The Code of 1863 was the work of a special legislative

code committee consisting of Judge Obadiah B. McFadden, former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Paul K. Hubbs, representing the Council, and J. D. Potter, S. D. Smith, and Paul K.
Hubbs, Jr., representing the House of Representatives.27

The authorization for the revision came through a joint
resolution passed on December 22, 1862.28 The commissioners
were to "re-codify the laws so far as practicable and to report
the same to their respective houses for action during the present session of the legislature." The compilation resulting from
26 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1862-63, 30.

¿1 It is interesting to note that iather and son served together on this commit-

tee, the senior representing the upper house and the junior the lower.
2S Journal of the Council, 1862-63, appendix x.
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their efforts was adopted by the legislature, a

the Code of 1863, It was regarded as an imp
preceding one.29
V

Less than four years elapsed before an agitation was begun for the revision of the Code of 1863. The principal reason
assigned at this time for the need of a new code was the wellworn argument that but few copies of the laws were available
for the use of lawyers and the public officials. "The efficiency
of public servants, as well as the proper administration of justice, require that they be put, as early as may be, in a shape that
will place them within the reach of all," wrote Governor Moore

in his legislative message of December 9, 1867.30 "I would recommend, therefore, that commissioners, 'learned in the law,' be
appointed to revise and codify all the statutes of the Territory
now in force and that they be instructed to report the result of
their labors to the Legislative Assembly, either at this or the
next session."

This legislative session approved the recommendation of
Governor Moore for a revision of the laws and provided for
the undertaking by means of a statute enacted January 29,
1868.31 In making this provision for the Code of 1869 the Territorial legislature used the "statute" form of authorization instead of the more common "resolution" form.

The statute in question provided that the governor was to

appoint three "discreet" persons (the governor had recommended instead three persons "learned in the law") to act as
code commissioners. They were to report their work to the
following legislative session, (1869). In the light of their injunction, "to thoroughly revise the statute laws ... in force . . . ,
classifying and arranging the various subjects under appropri-

ate titles, bringing together and incorporating the various
amendments into the original acts, and rejecting all repealed,
inoperative and obsolete statutes," one may wonder why the
29 Laws of Washington, 1862-63.

30 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1867-68, 31.

31 Laws of Washington, 1867-68, 64.
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sole requisite of "discreetness" was made the basis
qualifications as codifiers.

That the commissioners failed to "thoroughly rev
laws is evident from the changes which were subseque
posed. That the Code of 1869 went too far in "classify

arranging the various subjects under appropriate ti
the opinion of certain critics, who believed that it "w

cided success in the way of making the most out of the l

terial, being merely a labyrinth of reciprocating index
headings so honey-combed into each other, that the exp
variably comes out the same hole that he went in at. A
ute it is generally conceded to be a lamentable failure."3

It is doubtful whether the above criticism of the
1869 by the editor of the Washington Standard was alt
fair and justifiable. Certainly the gentlemen appointe
both "discreet" and "learned in the law." In fact, the

could hardly have chosen more capable commission
they. All three were able lawyers.33

It does not appear that either Mr. Lasater or Judge
son did any work on the revision of the laws. Judge Ev
mitted an individual report. In the meantime he had b
ted chief clerk of the House of Representatives, and on
of his work on the code report was also made clerk o
legislative committee on code revision. The result of
was the enactment of the Code of 1869/* which engr
least one new feature upon the law of the territory, t
munity Property Law. It has been said that, because of
actment and inclusion of the Community Property L
32 Olympia Washington Standard, September 13, 1873.
33 James H. Lasater of Walla Walla represented the first judicial district, Elwood Evans of Olympia, later of Tacoma, the second district, and B. F. Dennison

of Port Townsend represented the third district. Judge Evans (although referred
to as judge by all historians, the title was an honorary one only) was one of the
most promising lawyers of the territory. He had been admitted to practice law in
1852 at the first regular term of court held in Washington Territory, and already
had been clerk of the Council, secretary of the territory, acting Governor, and later
was to hold numerous other important public positions. Judge Dennison was at this
time an associate justice of the Supreme Court. He had settled in Whatcom in 1850
and at one time or another was a resident of nearly every important town in the
territory. He was later to become the first president of the Washington State Bar
Association when it was organized in 1889.
34 Laws of Washington, 1868-69.
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Code of 1869 was the most valuable code wh
ed during the life of the territory.35

The legislative session of 1868-69, filled
for code reform, proved to be a very busy o
committee on code revision accepted the rep
as the basis of its work. He recommended a revision of the

practice acts. To this, they prepared to add a revision of the
general laws, to the end that a complete general codification of
the laws of the territory might be obtained. To do this required
that the laws of a general character be re-enacted. To re-enac
these laws was a big task. Each had to be re-enacted in toto
The time had not come when the legislature was to feel free t
embody the laws into a general compilation with consecutive
section numbers and with titles and enacting clauses omitted.
The ghost of 1854 and the interpretation of section six of th
Organic Act were still before them.

The plan of the select joint committee was to re-enact all
existing statutes so that they might be incorporated into the
Code of 1869. They assumed, and probably correctly, that Congress would appropriate money with which to pay the bill. Had
not this been the intent of the act of January 29, 1868? Was
this not the objective which Governor Moore had recommended in his message of December 9, 1867? But Governor Moore
had been succeeded by Governor Alvan Flanders, and Governor
Flanders entertained a different view.

On November 24, 1869, Governor Flanders addressed a
message to both houses of the legislature in part as follows :36
"I have received from your honorable body a large number of bills
(not less than fifty) which have been sent in for my approval. All or
nearly all of these bills are general laws which have been re-enacted as
they now stand upon the statute books. These and many more of the
same character, which have been passed by one or both Houses, or which
are in the hands of the Select Joint Committee of your honorable body,
and which have not yet been reported for your consideration, are of equal

and perhaps greater importance than those that have been passed. The
35 James Wickersham, "Life, Character, and Public Service of Elwood Evans.
Pioneer, Lawyer, Governor and Historian," in Washington Historian (Tacoma,

January, 1900), i, no. 2, 63.
86 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1868-69, 406.
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object to be attained in the re-enactment of these laws is to embod
into a code properly arranged and printed as such.
"That this is desirable and perhaps necessary no one can doubt
it is of far greater importance that, in the compilation and re-ena
of these laws, they be thoroughly examined, and that they receiv

most critical revision and careful consideration at your hands.

you will readily admit that the time bestowed upon those you have
and that the time which now remains for the consideration of those here-

after to come before you is entirely too limited for the exercise of that
care which their importance demand.
"This would create expense without attaining the purpose at which

the codification of the laws aims. Among those which remain to be
passed, are:
An act in relation to practice and proceedings in civil actions.
An act in relation to practice in the probate courts of W. T.
An act in relation to crimes and punishments, and proceedings in
criminal cases, and an act relating to Justices of the Peace and their
practice and jurisdiction. A proper consideration of these laws alone,
will require much more time than remains of the present session.

"In view of these facts I would respectfully submit if it would not
be wise and judicious to refer all these bills to a commission to 'revise,
digest and codify the laws of the Territory* and report to the next legislature. . . .

"It is much better that our laws should remain as they now are,
than that their revision and re-enactment should be so hastily and imperfectly done as to create the necessity of repeating the labor and expense
of republication by a future Legislature."

Again on the 27th of November, the governor sent another veto message to the legislature and at the same time returned twenty-nine additional bills without his approval. In
further explanation of his action, he wrote :37
"Nearly all these bills are simply re-enactments of laws as they now

stand upon the statute books. A few of them have been altered and
amended in some unimportant particulars, they are now in force in our
Territory and are undoubtedly good laws. The object to be attained by
their re-enactment is to have them printed as the laws of the present session of the legislature as a portion of what was to form the 'code.' Their
publication would cost the government a large sum of money without
any corresponding benefit. It is very probable that in the end the Terri" Ibid., 430.
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tory would be obliged to pay the bill. But whether pa
or the general government, it would be an expenditur
not warranted at this time, and especially in view of
perfect manner in which the 'code/ of which the bil

been acted upon. It is doubtful if one of all the bi

Select Joint Code Committee, and which have been p

in either House. In view of these facts I return these bills to the House

from which I received them without my approval."

Corroborating this interpretation of the legislative extravagance, Mr. Snowden has written in his History of Washing-

ton that38 "... The changes which it [legislature] suggested
were, for the most part, merely verbal, but to make them in le-

gal form the acts in which they occurred were re-enacted. This
made it necessary, or at least permissible, to have them reprint-

ed for the use of the legislature, and thus greatly to increase
the work and profits of the public printer. To this the governor

objected, and vetoed the amended measures in batches."

While the attempt to prepare a codification of the laws,
which would embrace a revision of all existing law, was for the
most part a failure, the Code of 1869, when it finally was adopt-

ed, was a very substantial improvement over the previous attempts at codification. In the form in which it was enacted (the
later Code of 1873 was almost identical with it) this Code was
to remain in force until the codification of 1881.
VI

Common to each of the territorial codes of Washington
from 1854 to 1869 inclusive, was a provision which abolished
all distinctions between "actions at law" and "suits in chan-

cery" and provided one form of action to be known as a "civil
action." Such a statute had been incorporated into the laws of
several of the territories created by Congress in the years between 1845 and 1865, and represented a liberal interpretation
of that section of their organic acts which provided that "The
supreme court and the district courts, respectively, of every ter-

ritory, shall possess chancery as well as common law jurisdiction."39 These territorial legislatures construed this grant of
38 Snowden, iv, 183-84.
^Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), second edition,

section 1868.
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power to mean that chancery and common law jur
could be exercised jointly rather than severally.
It will be recalled that under a similar section in the Or-

ganic Act of Oregon Territory the code commissioners of 1853
refused to make such an interpretation, notwithstanding the

urgent plea of Commissioner Daniel R. Bigelow of Olympia,
who wished then to combine equitable and legal relief in one
proceeding.40

When this legislative power came before the United States

Supreme Court for review in a case arising in Montana, the
court held that the territorial legislature had no power to pass
an act depriving the territorial courts "of chancery as well as

common law jurisdiction."41 This decision was rendered on
May 1, 1871. Its effect was to render void the statutes of those
territories which had abolished the distinction between proceedings in law and equity.

As a result of this decision, the next session of the legislative assembly of Washington Territory, which convened on
October 2, 1871, was forced to amend the code of civil procedure by enacting that, "All common law forms of action are
hereby abolished, but the distinction between actions at law and
suits in chancery shall be preserved; . . . "42 To effect such a
change in the theory of civil practice without creating opposition from some members of the bar was probably an impossible task. At least, this was the effect of the amendments to the

Code of 1869. While the Amendments had a few advocates,
the majority of the bar felt that they were unreasonable and
ought to be repealed. With a dissatisfied bar opposed to the
Amendments of 1871, the possibility that further change and
repeal would be made by the legislative session of 1873 was not
unlikely. One of the leading newspapers of the territory editorially referred to the need for a new Code in clear and precise language :43
40 Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 20.
^Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt, 78 U. S. 610, (20 Lawyer's edition, 223).
42 Laws of Washington, 1871, 3.
48 Olympia Washington Standard, September 13, 1873.
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"The Civil Practice Act, or Code of Practice as
it is agreed by the lawyers, demands amendmen
something else. The whole bar appears to be uni
system of practice very defective and unsatisfac
any suggestions as to which system should re
hope that our representatives will set themselve
the very commencement of the session upon th
at least lay the foundation of some system of p
ples. Since the compilation of 1854, it can hardl
new one has in some particular been inferior to
The Statute of 1859 was only a partial reprint
1863 was an improvement upon that of 1859, bu
ferior to that of 1854. The Statute of 1869 was a decided success in the

way of making the most out of the least material, being merely a labyrinth of reciprocating indexes, with headings so honey-combed into each
other, that the explorer invariably comes out the same hole that he went
in at. As a statute it is generally conceded to be a lamentable failure. The
practice act of 1871 is founded upon another system, which has many ad-

vocates, and there are others who would prefer to see the old one restored. All its friends as well as its opponents, however, agree that as it
now stands it is very defective, and if continued should undergo many
changes."

The sequence of events which followed the passage of the
Amendments of 1871 presents an interesting but entangled relationship and one which does not lend itself easily to explanation.

One of the first matters to be considered by the Legislative

Assembly of 1873 which convened on October 6, was the question of revision of the laws of the territory and particularly the

Amendments of 1871. As no code commission had been previously authorized to prepare a proposed code, the legislature
appointed a select code committee, consisting of the judiciary
committees of both houses, to prepare a general compilation of
the laws. This procedure was preferred to that of a revision of
only the codes of civil and criminal procedure, probate, and justice court as had been proposed by John P. Judson of Tacoma.44
By October 25, the new practice bills together with about eighty

smaller bills, which were to be embodied in the compilation of
the laws, had been introduced into either branch of the legisla44 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1873, newspaper report.
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ture. On that date the Washington Standard hopefully
mented upon the possibility of a new code: "From wh
have seen and know of the matter, we feel happy in assu

the people of the territory of our belief that their repre
atives at this session will give them a compilation of the
with needed amendments, that will be satisfactory and be
cial to the public at large."

And further : "Our legislature will merit and receive
thanks of the public, if they succeed in presenting them
laws in one volume as the result of their labors at this session."

When the legislative session was over45 the people found

that the practice codes as embodied in the Code of 187346
were almost verbatim re-enactments of the similar codes in the

Code of 1869. This restored to the code of civil procedure the
provision which had abolished the distinction between actions
at law and suits in chancery, and which had substituted in place
of these two forms of action - a civil action. Neither the legislative records nor the newspaper accounts of the proceedings of
this session supply any explanation of why, in the light of the
holding in the decision of Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt, supra, the
legislative assembly should conclude that it had the power to
adopt a statute providing for a single form of action. In repealing the Amendments of 1871, apparently the legislature
had some knowledge of the principles involved in the case of
Hornbuckle v. Toonibs - a second attempt made by the Montana Territorial Legislature to establish its power to provide for
a "single form of action" - which was then pending before the
United States Supreme Court. This appeal had been presented
to the court on December 9, 1873, less than one month after the

Washington Territorial Legislature had re-enacted a code of
civil procedure embodying this principle.

Some idea of the feeling which had existed in the territory against these Amendments of 1871 may be found in the
following short paragraph taken from a decision by Mr. Justice Greene in the case of Gallenton Hartsock v. C. G. Tyler
which was tried in the second judicial district of the territory at
45 November 13, 1873.

46 Laws of Washington, 1873.
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Olympia in April, 1877. Judge Greene exp

feelings very fully in this long opinion from
are typical,47
"These Amendments of 1871 were passed, as it were, under duress,
in order that our territorial civil practice as part of a system finding its

most authoritative exposition in its court of last resort, the Supreme
Court of the United States, might be accommodated to the clearly announced views of that ultimate tribunal. But hardly had the amendments
been made before such counter opinions were rendered in the Supreme
Court and such counter ruling action was held in Congress, as have made
them entirely unnecessary [that] the very next legislature, therefore, repealed them."

Five months were to elapse before the decision of the court

in the appeal of Hornbuckle v. Toombs was to be handed down.
During this interval a bill had been introduced into Congress,
on February 4, 1874, with the purpose of authorizing territorial legislative sanction of the principle of the "single form of

action." The bill was duly approved by Congress on April 7,
1874; and in its form provided:
"That it shall not be necessary in any of the courts of the several
territories of the United States to exercise separately the common-law
and chancery jurisdiction vested in said courts; and that the several codes
and rules of practice adopted in said Territories . . . , in so far as they
authorize a mingling of said jurisdictions or a uniform course of proceeding in all cases whether legal or equitable, be confirmed ; and that all proceedings heretofore had . . . , be, and the same are hereby validated and
confirmed: . . . "48

The decision in the case of Hornbuckle v. Toombs fol-

lowed less than a month later.49 Unequivocally overruling
Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt , and two other similar decisions, the
Supreme Court confirmed the power of the territorial legislature, subject to the conditions of their respective organic acts,
to merge the claims at law and in equity in one action.50 It is
47 Elwood Evans' Scrapbook, 52. This scrapbook contains unreported decisions

of the district court.

4* The Statutes at Large of The United States, 1873-1875 (Washington, 1875),

xviii, part 3, 27.
« May 4, 1874.
60 85 U. S. 648 (21 Lawyer's edition, 996).
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a strange fact that the holding of the court was not b
the Act of Congress of April 7, 1874, and does not se
way to contemplate it.

While the records do not show that the justices of
ritorial Supreme Courts exercised any influence upo
sage of the Act of Congress of April 7, 1874, it is no
possibility that such was the case. The records do sho
this time Mr. Justice Greene of the Supreme Court
ington Territory was carrying on a correspondence
Judiciary Committee of the Senate concerning the p
another act affecting the jurisdiction of Territorial
Courts ;51 and reasoning by analogy, it is not improp
clude that a similar correspondence might have had s
ing upon the passage of the Act of April 7, 1874.52
settled the anomalous problems arising out of the Cod
and 1873 respectively.
VII

As a climax to a quarter century of experimental code

study, the Code of Washington, referred to from this point o
as the Code of 1881, emerged as the ne phis ultra of territoria
code making. The agitation for an amendment to the Code of
1873 conformed to what seemed to have been the normal rou-

tine of code making, viz., the adoption of a new code after the
lapse of about two legislative sessions. In this respect, the Code
of 1881 was no exception.
Legislative revision of the Code of 1873 was proposed first
in the session of 1877. The advocates of the code reform on

this occasion sought not only the amendment of the Code of
1873, but also that which had been sought continuously since
1854, namely, the adoption of a completely classified and sys51 Congressional Record (Washington, 1874), 11, part 4, 3585.

52 Questions of exceedingly great interest are rasied by the speculation as to

what attitude the Territorial Supreme Court would have taken toward appeals
which might have come before it based upon the provision of the Code of 1873
during the interim between November 13, 1873, when the legislature restored the
Civil Practice Act of 1869 and the passage of the Act of Congress on April 7, 1874.
Could the Court have found some basis for upholding the validity of the Civil
Practice Act of 1873? It would be interesting to know to what extent private rights
and remedies were affected by this practice act before the retroactive provisions
of the Act of Congress became effective.
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tematic code of laws of the present-day type

the type of the code desired is apparent from th

approved on November 9, 1877, being "An ac
the codification of the laws of Washington Te

Under the provisions of this act the codific
be limited to that of the practice act, as had bee
prior territorial codifications. The scope was t

er. The governor was "authorized and request

and by and with the advice and consent o

Council of said Territory, to appoint a code co
shall be a resident practicing attorney or judg
Court of the Territory." Doubtless the write
had familiarized himself with the phraseology
of the Constitution of the United States whic
dential appointments (Art. II Sec. 2), and desi
alogy to embody those principles into this sec
was exceedingly unusual language and had ne
any of the enabling acts which had provided
laws of either Oregon or Washington territor

The language of this enabling statute is

satisfactory study of the type of code which th

posed to enact. Several of the sections are as f

Section 2. The said code commissioner so appoin

thorized and required to collate and thoroughly revi
statute laws of the Territory of Washington which
force at the close of the present session of the legis
pose, it is hereby made the duty of said code commi
gether all correlative and similar statutes, classifyin
various subjects under appropriate amendments into t
jecting all repealed, redundant, inoperative and obsole
parts of laws ; and furthermore, to make such alter
ments as shall reconcile all contradictions, correct an
in figures, letters, words and sentences ; and, to do a
needful acts as shall enable the said code commission
duce and bring into a written, intelligible and systema
laws of this Territory.

Section 3. That it shall be the duty of the said
in codifying and arranging the laws under proper p
53 Laws of Washington, 1877, 235.
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and subdivisions, under the provisions of this act, to complete an
the same, that such code of laws shall be made to cover and em
whole body of substantive law of the Territory of Washington

code shall be arranged and presented by the code commissio
four general parts, or divisions, substantially, as follows :

I. The Political Code of Washington
II. The Civil Code of Washington
III. The Code of Civil Practice

IV. The Penal Code Embracing the Code of Criminal Procedu

Section 4. The said code commissioner is hereby further authori
and empowered to prepare a brief syllabus to each of the several law
and subdivisions and titles of law, in said codification, together with
concise and appropriate marginal notes for, and to, the various sect
as shall afford easy and ready reference to all distinctive points and
jects embraced therein ; and furthermore, to prepare such annotation
"foot notes," furnishing references to decisions, and correcting seem
contradictions in the laws, as shall be deemed useful and expedient.

Section 5. The laws so revised, codified and arranged by the c

commissioner appointed in pursuance of the provisions of this act,
when published, be embraced in one or more volumes of convenient
and shall be known as the Washington Code and no other title by le
reference shall be necessary for their designation.

Other sections made provision for the code commissio
er's compensation in such an amount as the legislative assem
should fix, and required that he take an oath of office, an
which had never been required of any preceding code c
missioner.

Only five days elapsed after the passage of this act until
the legislature adjourned sine die. Apparently this was an insufficient period of time in which to allow the governor to select

the code commissioner, and to get his appointment confirmed
by the council. Nothing was done about the appointment, and
the proposed codification did not materialize.

The bill was reintroduced into the legislative session of
1879 and was passed with but few changes.54 The first section
was changed so as to provide for the appointment of Governor
Elisha P. Ferry as code commissioner, and he was directed to
"make such additions as may be thought necessary for a com54 Laws of Washington, 1879, 90-92.
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píete and perfect code for the Territory of W
to submit the same in printed form.56 He was
salary of seventy-five dollars per month inst
tain amount provided in the Act of 1877. Bef
completed, this provision was to become the
controversy.

Governor Ferry was regarded as an admir
the duties of code commissioner. He was an
was just completing his second four-year ter
was believed that he would compile an accept
that reason was given the unusual power to "

tions as may be thought necessary." Such a

was tantamount to authority to alter or chan
laws and to interpolate them indiscriminately
most a modern Solon or Lycurgus.
One code writer has said that the inclusion of such lan-

guage is mere verbal extravagance. No codifiers would attempt
to make such changes, well knowing that some legislator would,

before final passage by the legislature, enter objections designed to render futile the plan of the codifier to interpolate the
statute.

Whether Governor Ferry felt constrained to exercise th
full measure of the authority granted to him by the legislatu
is doubtful. There is reason to believe that he did nothing mo
than lend his name to the proposed compilation, and that suc
work as was done was performed by his clerks, John P. Jud
son, Patrick P. Carroll, and U. M. Rasin respectively. Certain
critics of the governor openly charged that, although the cod
would not be completed, he would nevertheless make a claim
for the "clerk hire." The criticism of the governor went fu
ther and suggested that "the legislature . . . put the codificatio
in the hands of a competent and willing man and pay him fo
his services."

This attack upon the governor was answered by the Puget
Sound Courier, quoting in part articles in other papers,57 with
« Section 2.
56 Section 6.

57 Palouse (Wash.) Washington Gazette, reprinted in the Olympia Washington
Transcript, and answered by the Olympia Puget Sound Courier, September 16, 1881.
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a bitter denial that Governor Ferry would ask pay
clerk hire in codifying the laws. "It comes," says th
"with poor grace from the Hopkins family, father o
attempt to cast slurs upon ex-Governor Ferry. Besid

an act of base ingratitude, it is unsafe for them to do so
The newspapers which were unfriendly to the form
ernor were not alone in their conviction that no code would be

forthcoming. The legislative message of Governor Newell
hints that the governor himself entertained such a feeling. In

addressing the legislative session of 1881, he said: "My distinguished, immediate predecessor in the executive chair, was

appointed to codify the laws of the territory. I am not informed that he contemplates presenting a report at this session,
or at any future time/'59
Governor Newell seemed to feel that the codification of the

laws had not gone forward in the way that the legislative ses-

sion of 1879 had intended. He referred to the matter in his

message of October 3, 1881, and stated that he believed, "Suitable arrangement and classification of the laws would simplify
the administration of justice, and conduce to a large reduction
of the cost of litigation to the citizens," and concluded with the
remark, that the "codification should not be abandoned."60
The legislature, in turn, was skeptical as to what, if anything, had been done by the code commissioner in preparing a
code for their consideration. On the fourth day of the session
a resolution was passed appointing a committee of five members - three from the house and two from the council - to "as-

certain and report as soon as possible, the best method of revision and codification of the Washington Territory Statutes,
and also whether it would be advisable to undertake either, or
both, during this session."61 No record now exists as to what
report this committee made, but as the revision was actually
accomplished, it is obvious that their report must have recommended that favorable action should be taken.
58 Lazvs of Washington, 1881, 201, 210. The records do not show that Governor
Ferry ever received any compensation for his services but the clerks were each al-

lowed three hundred and sixty dollars.

59 Olympia Pug et Sound Courier, October 3, 1881.

60 Ibid.

61 Laws of Washington, 1881, 248.
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It is now impossible to know what, if a

done on the codification by former Governo

cal assistants prior to the opening of the
the opening of the fourth day of the sess
submitted to the legislature, and apparent
received as to the possible submission of su
able, however, that some work had actuall
the clerks selected by Commissioner Ferr
the legislature throughout the entire sessio

The work of code revision was placed

special legislative committee consisting of
cil committees on the Judiciary, Counties

enteen gentlemen in all.62 Of these, five wer
the other members represented the variou
ritory.64

After the legislature had been in session for nearly one
month and the character of its program had become known, a
letter was printed in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer of November 5, 1881. Its object was to advise the legislature as to the
feeling of the people in regard to the prospects of a new code,
and to urge that their civil and political rights should be protected. The writer of the letter, G. M. Haller, a prominent at-

torney of Seattle and associate of the late Judge Thomas
Burke, was doubtless sincere in his suggestions, but he could
hardly have hoped that the legislature would consider his comments, notwithstanding the logic which the arguments presented. In the end, however, much of what Mr. Haller had
suggested was actually accomplished.
"We are advised/' said he, "that the legislature now in session is
about to give us not only a new civil and criminal code, but a compilation
and codification of all the existing laws of Washington Territory, now
scattered through the diverse statutes from 1854 to 1879, and to that end
have formed an able Judiciary Committee, which committee has called to
its aid a corps of lawyers in the capacity of clerks, and we, the people,
62 House : J. A. Kuhn, Stephen Judson, W. W. Holcomb, W. S. Smith, James
A. Karr, G. F. Raymond, R. R. Reese, Albert Van Eaton, W. G. Preston, Thomas
Warman, Orin Kincaid, R. P. Steen ; Council : Elwood Evans, B. L. Sharpstein,
Jacob Hoover, J. W. Graden, J. H. Long.

63 Kuhn, Sharpstein, Evans, Hoover, Holcomb.

64 Message of Governor Newell to the legislature, December 7, I00I, as reported in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 13, 1881.
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are promised not only a complete compilation but also many
ments in both the civil and criminal codes of our territory. Th

important consequences following such a step and the actu

which any interference or unsettlement of existing and know
to the advancement and prosperity of our country is my apolo
following remarks, and if any suggestions herein containe
the learned gentlemen having the matter in charge I shall fee
paid, or if these matters have been thought of and provided fo
at least do no harm, and the people may more easily see the d
which their rights of personal liberty, personal security, and p
erty necessarily are involved in a hasty attempt to change or r
existing laws whose meaning has become partially known and s
long course of judicial decisions, following a cost of thousand
to the people in expensive and vexatious litigation.

"I use the word hasty, not in the sense of reflecting upon t
of the commission or its clerks, which will be done with all t
skill that the time will allow, and the character and high lega
its members will insure, but the legislative session can only l
The work was not begun until some days after the convening
sembly. It must necessarily be completed some weeks before
the session to give the executive time to consider its provisio
one may safely say that 30 or 40 days is all the time that can
for its completion. When we think what eminent judges and la
shrunk from the like attempt to be completed in two years, we
vel at the sublime courage of the committee now in charge of
But supposing the work is done and ready for final action of
bly, there will have to be a repealing clause or else it will be

tion. How is that to be made? A complete repeal of all pre

will wipe out all not contained in the new book. Is it within th
man to incorporate, adjust, reconcile and present all the laws
vital questions of property, or the conduct of our affairs, or th
of our persons or lives? If the repeal is only a repeal of all law
sistent or conflicting with the new ones, then we are where
mittee began, for we must search through all the old laws an
them to discover which are inconsistent.65

"Further, a repeal of the criminal practice act without a saving of
all pending prosecutions will be a general jail delivery; the law against
which the criminal offended being no longer in force, he cannot be held
for an offense against an ex post facto law. So an unguarded repeal of the
civil code may oblige every poor suitor either to begin action over again,
no matter at what stage it is before judgment, or if on appeal, may quash
the appeal.66
65 Covered by the Code of Washington, 1881, sections 3319 and 3320.
™lbid., sections 1296 and 761.
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"Yet all these latter matters may be, and no doubt
by the learned gentlemen who have the work in char
other matter equally important which may be ove
the custom of the assembly of Washington Territory

and especially the codes passed heretofore, (I belie
tions) shall go into effect from and after their pa

probably pass about the end of the month of Novem
be possible for the territorial printer to furnish the p
until May or June of next year, so that until that tim
especially the people will be in almost complete ignora
isting law really is.68

" . . . Until then the whole judiciary and bar will b
dark, perhaps their whole work wrong, and destined
the first light of the new law. In the meantime righ
may be sacrificed and wrongs unwittingly done. Wh
be well to provide that this new revision shall not go
of its provisions until August 1, 1882? That will give
ing, circulation, and reading of the law, and enable t
try their cases, and the Supreme Court to correct er

isting order of things. ..."

The work of the regular session moved slow
the sixty days were almost passed, it became

code could not be finished. Considerable talk of an extra ses-

sion was heard around the legislative halls, but many legislators

were of the opinion that an extra session would lack lawful
sanction. The governor himself was in doubt of his power to
convene the legislature, notwithstanding the provisions of the

Organic Act (section II)69 which stated that "the governor
shall have power to call the legislative assembly together by
proclamation, on an extraordinary occasion, at any time." He
felt that he was between two fires because an earlier statute
had provided that "no session of the legislature of a Territory
shall be held until federal appropriation for its expenses had
been made."70 Another section of the law71 obligated the Congress to appropriate four thousand dollars for the expenses of
67 Mr. Haller was in error in this regard. See Laws of Washington, 1868, 53,

which fixed the time as sixty days from the adjournment of the legislature.
68 The Secretary of Territory s certificate appended to the Lode of loöl is
dated May 24, 1882.

69 Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), second edition,

section 1923.

to Ibid., section 1886.
71 Ibid., section 1887.
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the territorial legislature, but until these expenses had
voted the governor felt that the legislature would have n
status.

At this point the governor transmitted to the legislature
a message72 in which he advised the legislature, that with the
special permission of the President73, he would reconvene the
legislature in special session at the close of their present session, in order that they should have more time to consider the
revision and codification of the territorial laws, which obviously would not be completed before adjournment of the regular
session. At that time but six days remained for the legislative
consideration of bills, and the revision had progressed too far
to permit its failing for want of sufficient time for its full
consideration. The governor expressed the opinion that much
disadvantage and disappointment would ensue if the codification were not completed.
A few days later (November 30) the governor received an
unsolicited letter from Chief Justice Roger Greene, of the Terri-

torial Supreme Court, which he in turn communicated to the
legislature.74 Judge Greene's advice, much in the nature of an
advisory opinion by the court, was for the purpose of assuring
the governor, as he said, "that there is no occasion to doubt
your authority to call the extra session, or the plenary power
of the legislature to make laws when met." The chief justice
supported his opinion by referring to a section of the Organic
Act, which authorized this procedure even in the face of a conflicting statute, and pointed out that the prior statute had been
qualified by the Organic Act which had been subsequently enacted into law.

Supported by the letters from the Secretary of the Inter-

ior and Judge Roger Greene, Governor Newell addressed a
lengthy message to the legislature on December 2, convening
them in extra session, at the expiration of the regular session.
In his message to the legislature the governor again explained
his reasons for calling the extra session, and enumerated the
72 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1881, 235.
73No authority for this procedure for the presidential power has been located.
74 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1881, 333.
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important laws passed by the legislature whic
bodied into the new codification, and conclude
stating that "Several important measures rem

ered in connection with the revision which in addition to those

here designated, when adopted, will necessitate and justify the
publication in one volume of the revised statutes of Washing-

ton Territory. ..."
Among the first bills introduced into the Extra Session of
1881 was one providing for the publication of the Code in the
territory. Although considerable opposition to this bill developed, the bill finally was passed, and the Code was printed by
C. B. Bagley, the public printer of the territory. An interesting comment on this legislative squabble is taken from one of
the newspapers of that day.75
"Governor Newell has issued his proclamation calling for a special
session of the legislature for the purposes of completing the codes, to remain in session not more than 20 days. Congress appropriated $3,000 for
printing the codes. Hon. Elwood Evans introduced in the council, a bill
directing the Secretary of the Territory to have the code printed in the

Territory. This bill does not suit Bancroft & Co., of San Francisco,
who, wishing the $3,000, have sent an agent to Olympia to lobby against

it. Mr. C. B. Bagley, of the Olympia Courier, also wants to print the
codes, and in the shape of a circular, offers to do the work on very
reasonable terms and in a short time. 'We fully and heartily agree with
Mr. Bagley that Mr. Evans' bill is correct in principle, as it provides that
the people's money shall be spent among the people from whom it was collected. If Mr. Evans' bill passes, the greater part of the $3,000 will go
to pay printers in the territory for the type-setting, presswork, and mechanical labor of the book.' The idea that a few dollars can be saved
tc the Government by allowing any printers out of the territory to print
the codes should not weigh an atom against the bill. We know there are
printing offices in the territory able to do the work in as good a style as it
can be done elsewhere. We hope that Mr. Evans' bill passes both houses
unanimously."

The extra session concluded its labors on Wednesday, December 7, 1881. Shortly before adjournment the governor dispatched to the legislature a message of good will in which he
summarized and praised their work. He called attention to the
fact that many incongruous, obsolete and inoperative statutes
75 Walla Walla Union, December 3, 1881.
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had been repealed and that the entire task was necess
intelligent, proper and economical administration of
conclusion, he said, "I commend the result to the can
perate and unbiased judgment of the people as a work
and intellectual labor, embodying the principles of s
drawn largely from the most moderate jurisprudence
precedented in that the burden of its preparation wa
posed and performed without pay. . . . "76
VIII

The manner in which the Code of 1881 was built, and
form which it finally received are stories none too well k
The many questions which might be asked concerning it c
now be answered. Only the House Journal was printed for
legislative session and it is not particularly helpful to a stu
this Code. The histories of the state throw no light upon
codification; and the newspapers are sadly lacking in edit

comments thereon. What was the character of the Co
1881 and how was it planned? How did it differ from
Codes which preceded it ?

With the aid of the revising clerks - John P. Judson,
rick P. Carroll, and U. M. Rasin - the select code committ
the legislature began the work of revision and codification

izing such work, if any, as had been done by Commiss
Ferry and his assistants before the opening of the legisl

session. The enrolled laws on file in the office of the Secr
of State, at Olympia, indicate that the legislature, itself,
the work of revising the laws then in force and of work
them into a tentative compilation. That this was the case
shown by the consecutive section numbers for the Civil
tice Act and the Criminal Practice Act, which are the firs

acts in the Code of 1881. The sections of each of these
were numbered from one to the end of the act. In addition to

these numbers for the sections of these two acts, the legislature
had also affixed consecutive code section numbers beginning
with the first section of the Civil Practice Act and ending with
76 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 13, 1881.
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the last section of the Criminal Procedure Act. This is illus-

trated by the first section of the Criminal Procedure Act which
is No. 1 of the act in question and No. 764 of the Code.
At this point, because of the shortage of time, the legislature decided to devote its efforts to revision, and to leave the

work of compilation to John P. Judson. In one of the final sections (3322) of the Code the legislature provided that John P.
Judson should be appointed to index the Code and prepare it
for publication.
In preparing the Code for publication the compiler was di-

rected to use all possible haste. He was directed to strip the
acts of their titles, enacting clauses, and clauses indicating time
of taking effect; and to give to the sections consecutive code

section numbers (section 3323). He was empowered to ar-

range the subject matter into chapters, and to give headnotes
and catchwords to the chapters and sections. While he was authorized to correct errors and omissions in the texts of the laws,

he was prohibited from altering or changing the law in any

way (section 3322).
In the light of the direction contained in section 3323, requiring the compiler to strip the acts of their respective titles,

much confusion has resulted from his failure so to do with the
first act in the Code. For some unknown reason he included the

title to the Civil Practice Act, being "An act to regulate the
practice and proceedings in civil actions." This title has the
appearance of being the title to the entire Code, whereas it is
the title to the first act only. If it were to be construed as the
title to the Code, treating the Code as one single act, the whole
codification would have been invalidated by the provisions of
section 6 of the Organic Act. It was probably included in the
compilation through inadvertence, and must not be regarded as
having any legislative significance.
It is not generally understood that the Code of 1881 is an
official legislative code. Each and every law contained in it was
re-enacted in its entirety at either the regular or extra session

of 1881. The Code provided that, in so far as its provisions
were identical with the prior acts, the code provisions were to
be construed as continuations of such laws and not as new en-
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actments (section 3319). In an early decision77 the Su

Court of Washington construed this section in the exact
of the statute, holding that its language clearly express
meaning intended and that in effect the Code of 1881 wa
a compilation of laws, but the old laws in a new form. Wh

er the provisions of the Code of 1881 differ from prior acts

general nature relating to the same matter, the code pro

are made to prevail, and the prior acts are thereby re
(section 3319). In those cases where the Code has omitted

of a general nature in force at the beginning of the sessi

1881 and not otherwise repealed, such laws are contin

full force and effect (section 3320), unless they are repug

to other acts upon the same subject passed or revised
regular or extra sessions of 1881.

The Code designated the classes of acts which were t
excluded from, as well as those which were to be includ
the published volume. Some were not to be codified, but
to be printed only in the Session Laws of 1881. These we
be the laws which related to appropriations, cities, towns,
ties, and acts of a private, local, and temporary character
dinarily the bound volume of the session laws for a par
session includes all laws passed at that session ; but the Se
Laws of 1881 omitted all laws included in the Code for th
son that they had been embodied into the codification.

If the bound volume of the Session Laws of 1881 b
amined, several interesting features will be observed. So
the acts included in it relate to matters which were to have been

included only in the Code of 1881 as provided in section 3321.

They were, however, placed in both places. These acts are
amendatory of prior acts relating to practice in civil actions,
probate, and the justice of the peace, and were passed and approved early in the regular session. In view of their general nature, it is not clear why they were placed in the session laws.
If the provisions of these acts be compared with the corresponding provisions of the Code, many variations will be noted,
the explanation of which rests in the fact that these acts did not
tiLiUell and Smythe Manufacturing Company v. Miller, (1892), 3 Wash. 480,

28 Pac. 1035.
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represent the last word of the legislature upon

cluded therein. The prior acts (Code of 1873)

by these same laws, but, before the Code of 188
ed, the separate acts comprising it were again
final passage so that the acts, which went into t
varied from the acts which were put into the
that year. Such changes were doubtlessly made
of the legislature and were in effect amendme

previously passed during the same session. T

can be established by the dates on the enrolled bill

office of the Secretary of State at Olympia. It i

for at least two reasons, these acts should no

cluded in the session laws. First, the acts fell wi

of subjects which were to be codified, and secon
laws as printed did not represent the final exp
legislative will upon the subject matter in ques
one instance the original law, as found in the S
1881, was placed in the Code as a footnote sect
this original act had been later amended before
sage. In this instance the footnote section was
misleading.
Reference has been made to footnote sections in the Code

of 1881. These footnote sections indicate laws which were inadvertently omitted by the compiler from the Code/9 and which

by the compiler's instructions, and the joint certificate of the
Secretary of the Territory and himself, were required to be included. Since the Code at this time had been printed, these addenda could not be embodied within the Code and given consecutive section numbers. If the comparison of the proof sheets
with the enrolled bills had been made in accordance with the
intent of section 3323, these footnote sections could have been

properly inserted and consecutively numbered accordingly.
Not many of these footnote sections are to be noted ; however,
nine sections follow the provisions of the Civil Practice Act,
and two sections follow the Criminal Practice Act. No others

have been located. They are equivalent to lost sections because
78 Code of Washington, 1881, section 1196. See footnote reference on page 230
of the Code : also Session Laws of 1881, 29.
79 See pages 156 and 230 respectively.
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they were not indexed in the Code; nor were they
Bagley's Supplement to the Code of 1881, which was p
a short time thereafter.

Statutory direction provided the plan of arrangement and
content of the subject-matter of the Code.80 The compilation
was to include:
First, the Constitution of the United States, and the amendments
thereto.

Second, The Organic Act and other acts of Congress applicable to
Washington Territory.

Third, The Naturalization Laws.

Fourth, All acts of a general nature revised and amended, or enacted at the eighth regular and extra sessions of the legislature.

No directions were made in this section concerning the arrangement of the statutes within division four, but section 3322

required the compiler to arrange and classify them in such
manner as he thought desirable.
In his arrangement of the contents of the Code, the compiler followed the order of the statute (section 3322) ; but the
classification of the statutes within division four was borrowed

from the prior codes. The first subdivision of the statutes is
that of Civil Procedure, followed by Criminal Procedure, the
Probate Practice Act81 and the Justice Practice Act respectively. The final subdivision of the statutes bears the caption "Miscellaneous" and contains all the statutes not of a procedural nature. The entire Code (aside from the first three divisions) is
again divided into two hundred and fifty-six chapters numbered

in Roman, each with its own individual caption. The caption
relating to school law (chapter 245) being a very long one is

further divided into titles.

Under the authority of the Acts of 1877 and 1879 providing for the compilation of the statutes the compiler was to present the Code under four divisions substantially as follows :
80 Code of Washington, 1881, section 3325.

81 Some copies of the Code of 1881 have, through error, repeated the caption
Justice Practice Act for the caption Probate Practice Act.
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1. The political code.
2. The civil code.

3. The code of civil procedure.
4. The penal code including the code of criminal procedure.

The Code of 1881, itself, specified four divisions, one of
which was to include all four of those listed in the Act of 18

This fourth division of the Code of 1881 was in turn so subd
vided as to take care of the Codes of Civil Procedure and Crim-

inal Procedure (including the penal code, which left the divisions of civil code and political code to be incorporated under
the caption of "Miscellaneous." It is, therefore, apparent that
the plan of arrangement suggested to the code commissioner
in 1879 was more logical than the plan finally adopted, and, had
Commissioner Ferry been more active in performing the duty
for which he was chosen, a more systematic compilation of the
law might have been forthcoming. It is not clear as to where
he would have placed the Probate Practice Act, but possibly it
could have been included in the division of Civil Procedure.

Most of the acts passed by the legislative sessions of 1881
carried emergency clauses which provided that, "This act shall
take effect and be in force from and after its passage and ap-

proval." Some acts added the words "by the Governor" after
the words relating to approval, but in every such instance
where not so added, the words were obviously implied. The
practice of indicating emergencies so as to make the statutes
immediately effective is a common one ; but it is also one which

is badly abused. In the absence of any reference as to when
statutes shall become effective the presumption is that they
shall take effect immediately,82 unless there be a constitutional
or statutory provision to the contrary. The policy of providing
that all acts, not otherwise declared to be emergent, shall take
effect sixty or more days after adjournment of the legislature
is also a common one. In fact, such a policy is controlled by a
constitutional provision in most states.83 No such provision was
82 Some acts passed in 1854 and subsequent sessions of the territorial legislature contained emergency clauses which made them immediately effective. Those
which did not have such clauses became immediately effective under the rule of the
presumption. Of what value then was the emergency clause?
83 Washington Constitution, article ii, section 31.
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incorporated into the Organic Act of Washington Terri
although it might properly have been so included. In th

sence of any such restriction, the territorial legislature was
to enact a law fixing the time when general laws should b

effective. This they did in 1868, in the following langua

Section 1. "From and after the date of the passage of this a
laws made and passed of a general nature shall not be deemed to h
take effect until sixty days after the sitting of the legislative sess
expired, unless otherwise directed/'84

This statutory provision being in effect at the time o
adoption of the Code of 1881 governed the date when th
became effective. The laws enacted at the session of 1881 and

comprising the Code became effective on February 7, 1882,
about three and one-half months before the printed Code was
distributed, unless they carried emergency clauses, and during
that time the people of the territory had no means of knowing
what laws were in force. No pamphlet laws were published and
few newspapers printed more than bare references to the enacted laws. This was one of the matters about which G. M.

Haller had written to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer on November 5, 1881.
IX

Few codes have been subjected to such a rigid judicial examination and construction as that which the Code of 1881 re-

ceived. Being an unique expression of the legislative will, it
has raised many interesting, and no less complex, questions of
statutory interpretation. The result has been two distinct theories of judicial construction and much dicta.
It will be recalled that each of the Acts of 1877 and 1879
provided that when the codification was completed and published, it should be known as the "Was hingt on Code/' The Legislature of 1881 reversed the words designating the title of the
Code making it to read "Code of Washington Territory/' (Sec-

tion 3325). The word territory was dropped when the title
page of the Code was prepared, leaving the title of the Code as
84 Laws of Washington, 1868, 53; Baglcy's Supplement, 16.
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"Code of Washington." Reference has be
ular designation of this Code as the "Co

such it was subjected from time to time to
The first two or three sessions of the territo
sequent to 1881 commonly referred to this
ignations. It was not uncommon in the sa

duce bills to amend the "Code of Wash
Washington Territory," "Washington Co
and simply the "Code." The titles to man

guage similar to the following, "An act to
chapter 238, of the Code of Washington T
to the decision of the court in Harland v. T
February, 1887 such titles were considered

In a lengthy opinion written by Mr. J
court held in the Harland case that a mere reference in the title

of an act to the section of a code, which is to be amended by
the act is insufficient and that such an amendatory act is void.
The basis for this interpretation was that the Organic Act of
Washington Territory, which stated that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title,"86
did not permit such form of amendment.
Judge Turner in his decision of Harland v. Territory set
forth at some length his theory of the Organic Act, in support
of his view, and quoted from many authorities. Among the arguments, he said that some statement of the purpose of a law
must be included within the title of an amendatory act in order that the title may indicate the object of the proposed law.
Such a statement might be very general or even meagre. To use
the word "amend" is, he says, sufficient. Law-makers do not
read the bills in full before they vote on them in session, al-

though theoretically they are supposed to do so. Bills are
passed with reference to title only. The words of purpose in the
bill are there for their information and guidance. Referring
specifically to the act, which proposed to amend the Code of

1881, being "An act to amend section 3050, chapter 238, of
the Code of Washington Territory/' Judge Turner said :
85 3 Washington Territorial Reports, 131.

86 Section 6; Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), sec-

tion 1924.
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"It seems to me that it is paltering with the Act of Congre
that the object of a particular law is to amend a section of the
that the title is sufficient if it express that much. It would be
curate to say that the object of all penal laws is to secure the p
good order of society, and that laws denouncing robbery, burg
larceny would have their object adequately expressed by the titl
to secure the peace and good order of society." The latter title g
beyond, as the former stops short of, expressing the true objec

ject of an amendatory act is not to amend. Such a construct

narrow ; it sticks in the bark. Legislatures do not amend simply

object of amending; the object in every case is to introduce
substantive rule of action by the new law, or to abrogate some

in the old law. It is attached to the old law because its provision
posed to be germane to that law. It might be enacted without r
to it; in which case its title would be required to give intimati
new rule. What magic is there in the name 'amendment' which

a law to which it is tacked from the salutary provisions app
every other law?"

The decision of Harland v. Territory grew out of
acts, one of which was designed to grant women the
suffrage. It is generally conceded that Judge Turner
sonally opposed to the principle of permitting women
That this had an effect upon his decision cannot be tr
said, but the decision did, however, "disclose his natu
in opposition to the policy of granting women the righ
frage."87 In the principles which it enunciated, it mus
to have held, that the Code of 1881 could not be amen
mere reference, in the title of the amendatory act, to
of the Code of 1881 , but that some words pertaining to

ject of the section of the act to be amended must also
cluded.

The decision was broad enough to effect the validity of all
acts of the territorial legislature which attempted to amend the
Code of 1881 in this manner.

In a decision which arose after statehood,88 the Supreme
Court applied the principles of Harland v. Territory and refused to hold a territorial statute valid which was, in effect, de87 C. S. Reinhart, History of the Supreme Court of the Territory and State of
Washington, 21.

88 State v. Halbert (1896), 14 Wash. 306, 44 Pac. 538, 64 A. S. R. 80.
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clared invalid by the holding of Harland v
theory that if the said statute was invalid
vived by that provision of the Constitution
"all laws now in force in the Territory of
are not repugnant to this constitution shall

til they expire by their own limitation, or be

by the legislature. ..."

The great antithesis of Harland v. Terri
cision which has been said with doubtful va
overrule it,90 was Marston v. Humes, decid
1891.91

This decision involved the validity of an act passed by the

legislature of 1891 entitled, "An act relating to pleadings in
civil actions, and amending sections 76, 77, and 109 of the Code

of Washington of 1881" In presenting the opinion of the
Court, Mr. Justice Hoyt took issue with the philosophy of his
colleague, Mr. Justice Turner. The question before the court
at this time was, in simple language, whether the title of the act
was broad enough to indicate the content of this act, as required
by the provisions of the Constitution, which states that, "no bill

shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title/'92

After subjecting the title of the act in question to the test
of whether the object of the act was clearly expressed therein,
the court decided that it was, inasmuch as the matter of vacation of judgments was a part of the subject of pleadings, and
the title stated that the act related to pleadings in civil actions.
On the basis of this conclusion the court upheld the validity of
the act in question. Having decided the question before it, the

remainder of the opinion of the court must be regarded as
dicta. In its holding in the case of State ex. rei Seattle Electric
Co. v. Superior Court (1902), the court, referring to Judge
Hoyt's opinion, said : "It is true, the learned writer of the opin-

ion went further, and stated that ... a section of such Code

may be amended by an act under a title which simply provides
89 Washington Constitution, article xxvin, 2.
»»Erickson v. Hodges (1910), 179 Fed. 177.
91 3 Wash. 267.

92 Washington Constitution, article n, section 19.

This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Fri, 08 Jun 2018 18:59:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

44 PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY [January

for the amendment of such section by its number, wi
designation of the subject matter of the section to b
ed."93 This opinion was reaffirmed in a decision rendered
court in the year following. In State v. Scott (1903) t
said: "True the court went further, and held in that case
[Marston v. Humes] that the Code of 1881 could be constitutionally amended by a mere reference to its section numbers

. . . "94 Both of these decisions seemingly are in accord with
Marston v. Humes, but in reality they are only in accord with
the dicta of this case.

In the course of his opinion in Marston v. Humes, Judge
Hoyt very apologetically referred to the necessity of a re-examination of the reasoning in Harland v. Territory. His reasons
may be summarized in the following manner :

(a) The court was at that time divided equally upon the
question,

(b) One of the judges was incapacitated from sitting,95
(c) Had the same case arisen in a different district of the
territory, a contrary conclusion would have been arrived at,96
(d) This court would not be justified in "blindly follow-

ing and accepting as law" the decision of half of said court
which constituted a majority of those sitting in that particular
case.

(e) That court was less favorably situated f

vestigation of the question in the light of the au
is this court.

(f ) Very few books were accessible to the court in 1887.

(g) That a large number of the cases cited are said to
have been so cited from digests rather than from the cases

themselves.

(h) This court has had the opportunity to fully examine
all the cases therein cited, and many more upon the same subject.97
93 28 Wash. 332, 68 Pac, 957.
94 32 Wash. 279, 73 Pac, 365.

95 Judge Hoyt.

96 The reason was that the case had arisen in the judicial district over which
Judge Hoyt presided.
97 During the three years since Harland v. Territory was decided the Supreme
Court Library must have been materially increased in size.
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(i) The first decision was based upon th

the Organic Act of the Territory; the Constit
now controls, and the Court is free to interp
limitations of the territorial decisions.

The last reason which Judge Hoyt offers is in reality a
begging of the question. Few people can distinguish the issues
in these two cases ; the content of the provisions of the Organic
Act and the Constitution is the same, although the wording differs. Most courts would have felt that the arguments in Harland v. Territory would have provided sufficient precedent for
subsequent problems of similar scope. One cannot refrain from
wondering whether the attitude of the court in the second case
was not largely motivated by personal bias rather than the sincerity of judicial reasoning.
One writer, untrained in legal science but supported by almost forty-three years of service as clerk of the court, has said,

and because of his intimate association with the history of the
court, his comment is deserving of considerable respect, that
in his opinion "Judge Turner's decision is much the more logical of the two, and, fortified as it is with subsequent decisions of

this court, is without doubt the law at present."98
Most students of the law regard the positions of the court
in these two decisions as unsatisfactory. They are frequently
heard to lament that the decisions are confusing. Some believe

that Harland v. Territory has been "specifically overruled,"
wThile others regard Harland v. Territory as still the law. They,
who contend for the latter view, must inferentially regard both
decisions as consistent, if not complementary. This conclusion
becomes the more convincing when the actual holdings of the
two decisions are compared.

98 Reinhart, 22.
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Marston v. Humes

Harland v. Territory
Question
An act to amend section 3050

of the Code of Washington Ter-

ritory (Code of 1881).

Question

An act relating to pleadings
in civil actions, and amending
sections 76, 77, and 109 of the
Code of Washington of 1881.

Decision

Decision
Act valid.

Act void.

Reasoning
Reasoning
The title of the amending act
The title of the amending act
did not contain any reference to did contain a statement of the
subject of the act to be amendthe subject matter of act to be
amended.

Conclusion

Inferentially this act, amend-

ing a section of the Code of
1881, would have been valid
had the title contained some

ed.

Conclusion

An act may amend a section
of the Code of 1881 if the title

contains a statement of the sub-

ject matter of the act to be

amended sufficient to give some
statement, however general or
idea of the purposes of the act,
meagre, which would have giv-

and the changes desired. In
en some idea of the purposes of
this case the act in question did
the act and the changes desired.
contain such descriptive lan-

guage.

Thus, in effect, both decisions hold that a section of the

Code of 1881 may be amended, providing the title of the
amending act contains sufficient statement of the purpose of the
amendment or gives a clear expression of the change in the law
which the amendment will effect.

Too frequently, the reader of judicial opinions, and the
digester also, fails to distinguish between the actual holdings
of a legal opinion and the learned dissertations or dicta, which
such opinions frequently contain. The syllabi of the decisions
contain frequent statements of dicta much too often accepted
as statements of the law laid down in the decision. Such was

the difficulty with the decision of Marston v. Humes. As an
example of this confusion the reader will frequently note that
Marston v. Humes is cited as authority for the rule (see syllabus) that "A section of the Code of 1881 may be amended by

This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Fri, 08 Jun 2018 18:59:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1937] BEARDSLEY: CODE-MAKING 47

an act under a title which simply provides fo
of such section by its number, without any d

subject matter of the section amended." Su

pure dicta. The decision itself did not hold th

Undoubtedly Judge Hoyt intended to so
courts have not willingly accepted this broad

utory construction," although frequent re
made to the language above quoted. To the
deductions of Judge Hoyt are convincing. C

velopment of his thesis is a masterpiece of ind
which must be read to be appreciated. The sub
gument upon the construction of the constit

that "No bill shall embrace more than one
shall be expressed in the title" is worthy o
"How," he said, "Shall this provision be inter
answer thereto, he said,

"I am of the opinion that the legislature must be
scope which they will give to the word "subject," an
title embraces but one subject, it is not inimical to suc
vision, even although the subject as thus used contai
subjects."
Furthermore, he said,

(a) That it cannot be contended, that a title would be void which
provided that the enactment was to be upon the subject of "pleading."
And,

(b) If the term "pleading" is sufficient, then it must be competent
for the legislature to enact as a single law a "code of civil procedure."
And,
(c) If the legislature can thus by a name sufficiently comprehensive
embrace all subjects properly relating to civil procedure, it must follow,
that, by adopting a subject sufficiently general, it can embrace in one act
all the "statute law of the State."100 Furthermore,
(d) If it is competent for the legislature to enact this entire body of
laws under a single title, it must follow that an act to "revise or re-enact"
the same would, upon familiar principles, be likewise valid. And finally,
(e) If the whole act can be revised or re-enacted under one title, the
same can be revised or re-enacted in part by way of amendments, provided
the parts to be amended are specified in the title.
99 State ex. rei. Seattle Electric Company v. Superior Court, supra 96.
100 The legislature of Oregon Territory attempted this procedure in 1849. See
Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 10.
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X

Closely allied to that judicial interpretation which has
made the Code of 1881, is the judicial definition and characterization which has accompanied its interpretation.
In the dicta of his concurring opinion in Harland v. Ter-

ritory, Mr. Justice Langford subjected the Code of 1881 to
severe condemnation and ridicule. With extraordinary contempt he said,
"We have a book which is marked on the fly-leaf, 'The Code of
Washington/ I have examined it, and find that it does not purport to contain any authenticated act of the legislature assembly of the Territory of
Washington. It purports to have been edited and compiled by a private

party. It contains no titles to acts, no enacting clause, no signature of
president of the council, speaker of the house, or governor. It is not
certified by the secretary to be or contain a true copy of any legislative
act. The chapters, divisions, and sections all purport to be the act of a
private party. His sections run up to 3327, and in the book is an unauthenticated provision that a certain private party shall publish parts of a
certain class of laws which he shall deem to be general, and leave out certain parts of all acts, and leave out entirely others. He certifies that he

has examined all the laws embraced in the volume (the Code), etc., and
put redundant matter in parentheses, and matters omitted from enrolled
laws but supplied by him are enclosed in brackets.
"Now it is clear that this book contains no act passed by the legislative assembly, and it cannot be known officially what it does or does not
contain. We suppose that this is the private book which the Act of 1883
purports to amend."

It is obvious that this characterization by Judge Langford
is unfair and unjust. Certain comments are wholly inaccurate,

while the whole tirade breathes of bias and prejudice. Needless to say, his view of the character of the Code of 1881 was
not entertained by the bar of the territory, nor by his associate,

Mr. Justice Greene, who in his dissenting opinion, says, "From

all that is decisive and much that is not decisive, ... I totally
dissent, ..." The answer to this tirade of Judge Langford was
made by Judge Hoyt in the course of his opinion in Marston v,

Humes, By way of quest, he asked (at page 272), "Is there
such a thing known to the law of this state as the Code of
1881?" By way of answer, he said, "the proposition is too clear
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for extended argument. . . . The legislatu
re-enacted the laws which now constitut
that the laws thus revised and re-enacted

and consecutively sectionized from the first

such laws when so placed and numbered i
constitute the Code, and I can see no reaso

expressed should not have force. Beside

this, the legislature by constant referenc
as the "Code of 1881/' have clearly shown
same as such Code; and for the courts to h

such thing as the Code of 1881 would, in
lence to every rule of judicial interpretati

The above holding in language some
phrased is to be found as one of the points

above case, and, in its syllabic form, th

cited with approval by the court in a num
XI

The legislature specifically provided that the laws of a general nature not repealed by the Code of 1881, were to continue
in full force and effect. It was their intention that all such laws

should be incorporated into the Code, The legislators did not
intend that any laws of a general nature should be overlooked
by the sessions of 1881. The purpose of the saving clause (section 3320) was to save any such laws which had been inadvertently omitted from the procedure of repassage in either the

regular or extra session. It was the belief of the legislative
committee that all such laws had been repassed ; and the members of the code committee did not realize that any had been
overlooked; but, in fact, some seventy-seven general laws had
been forgotten.

After several months had elapsed, John P. Judson and Elwood Evans, both former members of the code committee of
1881, prepared a compilation of these lawrs consisting of fifty

pages including an index. The compilation was in the nature
of a supplement to the Code of 1881, and follows somewhat the
plan of the latter in omitting the titles of the acts. It was not
arranged into sections as in the Code of 1881, but it listed the

This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Fri, 08 Jun 2018 18:59:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

SO PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY [January
dates of the laws which was a feature that the Code did not in-

clude. The authority of these laws does not rest upon this supplement for their sanction, but upon the strength of the saving

clause of the Code of 1881 (section 3320), which preserved
them. It is not an official compilation like the Code and has nev-

er received legislative approval.
The supplement has come to be known as Bagley' s Supplement because it was printed by Clarence B. Bagley, then the
state printer. In referring to the supplement by way of a preface to the volume Mr. Bagley has said :101
"The Legislative Assembly of 1881, in the enactment of the 'Code
of Washington/ and the session laws of 1883, did not include many laws
of a general nature, which, by the terms of the repealing clause of the

Code, are still in force. These are scattered through the session laws,
from 1855 down to date, and the following compilation is thought to in-

clude all such laws of a general nature, not appearing in said Code of
1881 and laws of 1883, but still in force in Washington Territory. The
question may arise whether some of these laws have not been repealed,
but as at present advised, they are thought not to be, and hence are included."

There seem to be two distinct editions of the Supplement to

the Code of 1881. The second edition, while not so marked,
bears the imprint date of 1884. Since the contents of this edition present some interesting variations, particular reference
must be given to them.
The 1884 edition contains two laws more than the 1881

edition, but five laws are included in the 1881 edition which do
not appear in the 1884 edition, and six laws are to be found in
the 1884 edition which are not contained in the 1881 edition.

These six laws of the 1884 edition are laws relating to county
boundaries and were not passed until the legislative session of
1883, which explains their absence from the 1881 supplement.
Of the five laws contained in the 1881 supplement and missing
from the 1884 edition, two were repealed by the 1883 legislative
session, one was a temporary law which expired by its own
terms in 1883, another was a statute which had been repealed
prior to 1881 and was picked up and included through mistake.
101 John P. Judson and El wood Evans, Laws of Washington Territory (Olympia, 1881), 2.
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The last statute in question was probably omitted
plement of 1884, through inadvertence.
XII

As was true of all the territorial codes, the Code of 18
was not without its critics. The extent of the agitation fo
new revision of the laws prior to the session of 1887 is
known, but that such a demand had strong political suppor
certain. In his message to the legislature of 1887, Gover
Semplesaid:102

'The laws of this territory, owing to careless legislation and d

sions of the courts, are in such a state of confusion that it is very diff
even for experienced members of the bar to arrive at any definite c
clusion in regard to them, much less can a citizen exactly determine
rules that govern his conduct, or the laws that guarantee his rights
privileges. Consultation of our laws by our citizens is rendered still m
difficult by the absence of anything that can properly be called an ind
the volumes. To remedy these faults there seems to be a general des
for the codification of our statutes. I suggest that instead of a codif
tion of our present law, a commission be created and instructed to p
pare for submission to the next legislature a civil, a criminal, and a
bate code, being guided in their labors by an adherence to the spirit
our laws as heretofore instituted. It should also compile all general l

under a separate head, and provide a competent index for the w
system."

The legislature regarded with approval the recommend
tion of the governor relative to a code commission. House
No. 118, being "An act to provide for the appointment
code commission," was introduced into the house on Mond
January 9, 1888, by T. J. V. Clark of Yakima County. The
was referred to the Judiciary Committee which reported it
favorably on January 27. The proposal was approved by
House on that day, and by the Council on January 31, and
signed by the governor on February 2.103

In the code commission act of 1877, the governor was
appoint as a commissioner either an attorney, or a judge of
102lValla Walla Union, December 17, 1887.

MLaws of Washington, 1887-88, 44.
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Supreme Court. By the act of 1879, the selection was limi
to former Governor Ferry, an attorney of considerable pr
nence. Notwithstanding the failure that Governor Ferry m
of codification in 1881, the legislature still had confidence in

legal profession. Perhaps this was due to the excellent ser
rendered by the select code committee in the legislative se
of 1881, on which, there were nine attorneys.104 The fac
mains, however, that in the Act of 1888 the governor wa

appoint, not one attorney but four attorneys, residents105 of

territory who were then practicing law. Two of these appo
ees were to belong to each of the "Great political parties."
may well wonder what importance party affiliation could
upon this task.

The commissioners were to meet within thirty days af
their appointment and enter upon the discharge of their d

(section 2). No oath was to be required. The duties as ou

lined by the legislature were "to revise, codify and fully
pare a code of the laws of said Territory, having reference

adhering as closely as practable to our present system"
tion 1 ) . In section 3 it was also provided that :

"It shall be the duty of said commission to prepare in the best fo

a code of laws for general use in said Territory, adhering as clos

may be proper and practicable to the present system and laws, and to
range the same logically and systematically under the proper headin
and chapters supplying any omissions and imperfections that may n
exist, at the same time adopting practical necessary forms of laws,
keeping in view the laws and forms, and arrangement of the same no
use, in the states and territories under the code system. Said code s
be fully prepared and shall be submitted in written or printed form
the next regular session of the legislature on the first day thereof."

In consideration of their services, the commissioners w
to receive seven dollars per day. They had the power to app
a clerk at the rate of five dollars per day, (section 2) and fo
expenses of service the legislature appropriated seven thou

dollars (section 4).

104 Kühn, Evans, Hoover, Sharpstein, Judson, Rasin, Carroll, Comegys, H

comb.

105 It is not clear why this word was inserted. Perhaps it was intended to refer

to William Lair Hill who had published a code for Oregon in 1887. He was at this
time a resident of California but was then preparing to move to Seattle.
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As members of this code commission Govern

pointed W. H. Doolittle of Tacoma, J. H. Sniv
T. H. Came of Seattle, and A. E. Isham of Wal

croft has said,106 that as the "passage of the enabli
dered it undoubted that the state constitution would differ ma-

terially from the organic law of the territory, the commission
suspended its labors until the state constitution has assumed
definite form, when it revived its work."
What, if anything, was accomplished by this commission
is problematical. No record is left of their "labors" and, if a
report was filed with the governor, it was buried in the administrative archives and was never recorded. Doubtless the question of code revision was permitted to lag because of approaching statehood and the current belief that thereafter a new state
code would be needed. Certain it is, that one of the first acts of
the first legislative session, after statehood had been granted,
was to provide for a complete and thoroughly revised system
of laws.108
Arthur S. Beardsley

University of Washington
Bibliography of Washington Territorial Codes

(Throughout the preceding article the term "code" has been used
its popular rather than its technical sense. The codes do not have ind
ual paginations separate from that of the other general acts but usu
will be found at the front part of the volume.)

Code of 1854, in Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1854. (Ol

pia, 1855. Lxvii 488 pp.)

Code of 1859 [1860], in Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the T

tory of Washington, 1859-60. (Olympia, 1860. in 523 pp.)
Code of 1863, in Statutes of Washington Territory, 1862-63. (Olymp
1863. xc 144 v 572 pp.)

Code of 1869, in Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1869. (O
pia, 1869. 832 pp.)

106 H. H. Bancroft, History of The Pacific States of North America: W
ington, Idaho, and Montana, 1845-1889 (San Francisco, 1890), xxvi, 299.
107 Ine Statutes at Large and lreaties of lhe United otates of America, Iõ51-

1855 (Boston, 1866), x, 172.

ios For certain help in the preparation of this article the author is indebted to
Mr. Arthur Remington of Tacoma and Mr. Frank Pierce of Seattle.
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Code of 1871, Amendments, in Statutes of the Territory of Washi

1871. (Olympia, 1871. 262 pp.)

Code of 1873, in Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1873. (Olym
1873. 776 pp.)

Code of 1881, in Code of Washington. (Olympia, 1881. xlviii 580 pp.)
Bagley's Supplement to Code of 1881, in Laws of Washington Territory,

compiled by John P. Judson and Elwood Evans. (Olympia, 1881.
50 pp.)
Bagley's Supplement to Code of 1881, compiled by John P. Judson and

Elwood Evans, [second edition.] (Olympia, 1884. 50 pp.)
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